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This paper studies entry in a market where rms compete in shopping hours and
prices. I show that an incumbent rm is able to choose its opening hours strategically
to deter entry of a new rm. The potential eects of entry deterrence on social wel-
fare depends on the degree of product dierentiation. Entry deterrence increases social
welfare when product dierentiation is low, while it reduces social welfare when product
dierentiation is high. In terms of policy, the result of this model suggests that shopping
hours deregulation is not always welfare enhancing.
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11 Introduction
Shopping hours regulation has been widely debated in many European countries.1 In the
past decades, countries such Sweden and the U.K. extended their opening hours in the retail
industry. Others countries, e.g. Austria, Denmark, Finland and Norway, are more sceptical
and maintain restriction on shopping hours. The main concern of shopping hours liberaliza-
tion is how deregulation may aect the structure on the competitiveness of the retail industry.
After deregulation, a rm with cost advantage might decide to open longer hours in order
to attract additional consumers from those rms without such a cost advantage and, thus,
aecting the composition of dierent rms' size in equilibrium.2 On the demand side, since
consumers might prefer to go shopping at dierent times, when opening hours are liberalized
retailers can attract additional demand by extending their opening time and charge higher
prices because some consumers are willing to pay for time exibility. On the other hand,
deregulation of shopping hours might also aect the incentives of entry into the market and
how incumbent rms may respond to a threat of entry. This possible eect of shopping hours
deregulation has not been studied, and this paper studies whether rms have incentive to
use opening hours as a strategic variable when there is a threat of entry into the market. I
show here that there may be entry deterrence strategies in a market where rms compete in
shopping hours and prices. I also study the welfare implications of this behaviour and so the
potential impact of shopping hours deregulation.
There is evidence from theoretical and empirical literature that changes in opening hours
inuence the structure of the retail industry. Early studies focused on the eect of longer
opening hours on the demand faced by stores of dierent sizes and, thus, on their prices
levels (Morrison and Newman, 1983; Tanguay et al., 1995). They show that shopping hours
liberalization may cause a redistribution of sales from small to large stores, and higher prices
at large stores. Most recently, studies have considered opening hours as a strategic variable
among a xed number of retailers and focused on how prices respond to shopping hours
deregulation (Inderst and Irmen, 2005), and the relationship between equilibrium business
hour conguration and exibility of consumers to advance or postpone their shopping (Shy
and Stenbacka, 2008). They found that retailers with longer opening hours charge higher
prices because opening hour dierentiation softens price competition. Wenzel (2011) extend
their analysis to the case of rms' eciency asymmetries. He shows that an independent
retailer may choose full-time opening hours while the retail chain chooses part-time opening
hours and gain from shopping hours deregulation when eciency dierence in favour of the
1See for example Morrison and Newman (1983), Ingene (1986), Kay and Morris (1987), Ferris (1990).
Tanguay et al. (1995) study extending shopping hours in Canada.
2This may be the concern between the dierences of large retail chains and smaller retailers.
2retail chain is small. Conversely, an independent retailer may choose part-time opening
hours while the retail chain chooses full-time opening hours and lose from shopping hours
deregulation when eciency dierence in favour of the retail chain is large. Finally, Shy and
Stenbacka (2008) consider the eect of shopping hours deregulation on the social welfare.
They suggest there is no justication for restrictions on shopping hours. Similarly, Wenzel
(2011) nds that shopping hours deregulation increases total welfare and consumer surplus.
My framework builds on Inderst and Irmen (2005) and Shy and Stenbacka (2008), but
focuses on the possibility of entry in the market, in particular how an incumbent rm may
respond to an entry threat. I consider a model of oligopolistic competition with product
dierentiation in two dimensions; space and time. I adapt the Hotelling (1929) model of
spatial dierentiation to study a market where rms compete for consumers with dierent
preferences in their shopping hours. The interaction between the incumbent and a potential
entrant is analysed in a three-stage game. In the rst stage, the incumbent chooses its
opening hours. In the second stage, after observing the decision taken by the incumbent, the
potential entrant decides whether to enter or not the market and, in the entry case, chooses
its opening time. Finally, in stage three and if entry occurs, incumbent and entrant compete
in prices. The structure of the game is intended to capture the idea that the incumbent's
decision about its opening hours can aect entry and the industry structure equilibrium.
The main result is that entry deterrence is possible: for some parameter values in the
model, the incumbent uses opening hours to deter entry. This result has important implica-
tions in terms of social welfare. In fact, social welfare can be greater under entry deterrence
when product dierentiation is low. On the other hand, social welfare can be lower under
entry deterrence when product dierentiation is high. There are two possible driving forces
for this result that depends on the industry equilibrium conguration comparison. First,
when comparing entry deterrence with an equilibrium where both incumbent and entrant
compete in the market and both rms open longer hours, industry prots is the main driving
force. This is because with low product dierentiation industry prots with entry deterrence
are relative high, while industry prots are low with intense price competition. Second, when
comparing entry deterrence with an equilibrium where both incumbent and entrant compete
in the market but none of them open longer hours, consumer surplus is the main driving
force. This is because with low product dierentiation the positive eect on consumers' wel-
fare of the longer opening hours chosen by the incumbent to pre-empt entry can dominate
the negative eect of higher prices with entry deterrence. In terms of policy and contrary to
the previous ndings, the result in this setting suggests that shopping hours deregulation is
not always welfare enhancing.
3This paper contributes to two types of literature. The rst contribution is to oligopolistic
competition in multi-dimensional product dierentiation, concerning location in space and
time dimension.3 Inderst and Irmen (2005), and Shy and Stenbacka (2008) analyse a two-
stage game of duopolistic competition with a xed number of rms, so they do not consider
the possibility of entry into the market. The second contribution is to the literature of en-
try deterrence. I show that entry deterrence is possible in markets where rms compete in
shopping hours and prices: an incumbent rm can use opening hours as a strategic commit-
ment. This result closely relates to the pre-emption strategies studied by Bonanno (1987),
Eaton and Lipsey (1977) and Schmalansee (1978), where pre-emption occurs through strate-
gic brand proliferation: incumbents expand their products lines to leave no protable niche
to entrants. Longer opening hours can also be interpreted as product dierentiation in the
time dimension which creates barriers to entry in the sense of Bain (1956).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 characterises the price equilibrium of the game. Section 4 analyses the equilibrium shopping
hours and entry into the market. Section 5 studies the potential eects of an entry deterrence
strategy in terms of social welfare. Section 6 discuss the possible eects of shopping hours
deregulation. Finally, section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
I use a model of duopolistic competition with product dierentiation in two dimensions:
space and time. For this purpose, I adapt the standard Hotelling (1929) model of spatial
dierentiation adding the time dimension. The location of rms is exogenous. This is to
make the model tractable, and as the focus of the analysis is on entry into a market with
shopping hours and price competition, is not a strong restriction.
2.1 Consumers
Consumers are dierentiated along two dimensions: i) distance to stores' location, and ii)
preferred shopping time. Along the rst dimension, consumers are uniformly distributed
along a unit line, l 2 [0;1], and each of them buys, at a transportation cost of  > 0 per
3The most well known models of two-dimensional product dierentiation are from Economides (1989),
Neven and Thisse (1990), and Tabuchi (1994). As pointed out by Inderst and Irmen (2005), the two-
dimensional product dierentiation we study has two major novelties. First, we consider a uniform distribution
of consumer preferences with respect to shopping hours, capturing the empirical fact that most consumers
prefer to go shopping during the day. Second, we consider a rm's product variant characterized by a point
in the geographical space and an interval in the time space.
4unit of distance, one unit of product. Along the time dimension consumers are of two types.
The rst type prefers to go shopping during the day, D, and the other prefers to go shopping
during the night, N.4 For example, when consumers go shopping to a grocery store, some
of them may prefer to shop during day because they can nd more variety of fresh products
(vegetables, fruits, sh, etc.), while others shop during the night because of working hours
restrictions. There is a unit mass of consumers of two types, which are distributed uniformly
on the unit line: a mass  of consumers of the rst type and a mass 1  of consumers of the




. This means that the number of consumers who prefer to shop
during the day is greater than those who prefer to shop at night.
Each consumer can be represented in this model by a pair of coordinates (l;t), where l
corresponds to the horizontal dierentiation characteristic in the unit line, and t 2 fD;Ng
corresponds to the time preference of shopping hours. The utility function U : [0;1] 
fD;Ng  ! R of a consumer with preference (l;t), derived from buying the product at a
price pi charged by a rm located at li with shopping hours ti, is given by




 if t 6= ti;
0 if t = ti:
V 2 R+ is the consumers' basic utility derived from the consumption of the product and
pi 2 R+ is the price a consumer pays to rm i for the product. I assume that V is suciently
high such that the market is covered. The term jl   lij is the transportation cost for
the consumer, located at l, of shopping from rm i, located at li. The parameter (t;ti)
is associated with the time dimension and represents the distance between the consumer's
preferred shopping time, t, and rm i's opening time, ti. If t 6= ti, the consumer has a cost
 because the store is not open at the time she would like to buy the product, and if t = ti
there is no cost in time because the consumer can buy the product at her preferred time. If
the consumer does not buy the product she gets zero utility,  U(t;l) = 0.
4Inderst and Irmen (2005) and Shy and Stenbacka (2008) used the circular model of Salop (1979) to
represent shopping time dierentiation. In those models each point in the unit circle represents an ideal
shopping time for a continuum of potential shoppers. My model simplies consumers' ideal time to a discrete
preference for shopping time; day and night.
52.2 Firms
I consider an oligopolistic sector with two rms, i = I;E, selling a product. The incumbent
I is already in the market, while E is a potential entrant that can enter the market by paying
a sunk cost F > 0.
The incumbent is located at 0 and the entrant may only locate at 1.5 Along the time
dimension, incumbent's decision of opening hours is a discrete choice between three options:
i) open only during the day, D; ii) open only during the night, N; and iii) open all day, A,
where A = D [ N. Entrant decides entering or stay out, and if entrant enters the market,
chooses between D, N or A. Notice that in the standard Hotelling model the two rms sell a
product that is identical in all respects except one characteristic, which is the location where
it is sold. In the present framework, rms sell a product which is dierent in the location
where it is sold (spatial dimension) and also in the time when it is sold (time dimension).
For simplicity and without loss of generality, marginal costs are constant and normalised
to zero. Firms incur in a xed operating cost which depends on the opening time. I assume
operating costs during the day or during the night are the same, k > 0, while the cost of
operating all day is k, for  2 (1;2]. This means that rms can have increasing returns to
scale in opening time.
The interaction between the incumbent and a potential entrant is analysed in a three-
stage game. At stage 1, incumbent chooses its opening hours tI 2 fD;N;Ag. Then, at stage
2 and after knowing tI, entrant chooses tE 2 fOut;D;N;Ag. I assume, following Inderst and
Irmen (2005) and Shy and Stenbacka (2008), that retailers commit to their opening hours
choices in the long run. Finally, at stage 3 and after having observed incumbent and entrant
decisions, rms compete in prices, that is rm i chooses pi, i = I;E, if the entrant has entered
the market, otherwise the incumbent behaves as an unconstrained monopolist when there is
no entry threat. I assume rms cannot price discriminate. I look for the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies.
3 Equilibrium Prices
In this section I analyse the equilibrium of the last stage of the game. In order to facilitate
the exposition, I rst study the case where the incumbent does not face an eective entry
threat due to prohibitive entry costs, that is entry is never protable for the entrant. In this
situation the incumbent chooses prices as an unconstrained monopolist (Section 3.1). Then
5This assumption allows to focus the analysis on rms' decision of opening hours and, thus, the eect in
the industry equilibrium.
6I discuss the case where the entrant enters the market and both rms compete in prices
(Section 3.2).
3.1 Incumbent without threat of entry
Assume the entry cost is suciently high that entry is never protable for E. In this situation
the incumbent behaves as an unconstrained monopolist. Suppose it charges pI, then the
demand function is given by
DI(pI) = minflD;1g + (1   )minflN;1g (2)
where lD and lN are the consumers with day and night preference who are indierent
between shopping at I or not. The location of the indierent consumer depends on the
opening time chosen by the incumbent. When tI = D, the marginal consumer for the rst
type is lD =
V  pI
 , and the marginal consumer for the second type is lN =
V  pI 
 . When
tI = N, the marginal consumer for the rst and second type are lD =
V  pI 
 and lN =
V  pI
 ,
respectively. When tI = A, the marginal consumer is lD = lN =
V  pI
 .6
The incumbents' payo is I(pI) = pIDI(pI)   K, where K = k;k. So, given opening
hours' decision, tI, equilibrium prices is given by p
I 2 argmax
pI
I(pI). The prices and
incumbents' payo are showed in Table 1.
Since  2 (1
2;1], prices are higher when tI = D than when tI = N. Moreover, given
that opening only during the day and opening only during the night have the same operating
cost, incumbents' prots are higher when its store is open only during the day than when
the store is open only during the night. When the incumbent opens all day prices are
higher than the prices charged when the incumbent opens only during the day, meaning that
consumers have to pay more for longer shopping hours. Intuitively, when the incumbent
opens all day is able to charge a higher price because consumers with night shopping hours
preferences want to benet from the advantage of having zero disutility in the time dimension.






(1 ), and the equilibrium price is p
I =
V  (1 )
2 . The opposite
result emerges when the inequality reverse and the equilibrium price in this case is p
I = V
2 .
The second term in the LHS of the inequality can be interpreted as the transportation cost
multiplied by the additional operation cost of opening all day, and the RHS is consumers'
valuation from the consumption of the product, all in terms of the disutility in time for the
night preference consumers.
6The marginal consumers are derived from (1).
73.2 Duopoly
Let us now suppose that the sunk cost is not so high to prevent the entrant from making any
prot. Therefore, if E enters the market, the incumbent and the entrant compete in prices,
given opening hours choices (tI;tE). Denote pI and pE the prices charged by the incumbent
and entrant, respectively. Firms' demand functions are given by
DI(pI;pE) = minflD;1g + (1   )minflN;1g (3)
DE(pE;pI) = minf(1   lD);1g + (1   )minf(1   lN);1g (4)
The marginal consumers are derived from (1) considering that a consumer is indierent
between shopping at I or E when V  pI  jl   lIj (t;tI) = V  pE  jl   lEj (t;tE).
When tI = tE both rms are open or closed at the consumers' preferred shopping time.
Then, the location of the indierent consumer is lD = lN = 1
2 +
pE pI
2 . In this case, only
the transportation costs and prices aect the consumers' decision of where to go shopping.
Thus, when rms are open at the same time and given that consumers' time preference is
uniformly distributed in the space, only spatial dierentiation matters. In other words, with
parallel opening hours there is no product dierentiation with respect to time and there is
product dierentiation as in the standard Hotelling model.
When tI 6= tE one rm is opened and the other rm is closed at a given period of
time. In this case the indierent consumers are dierent; lD 6= lN. The location of the
indierent consumer with day shopping time preference, lD, is derived from V  pI jl   lIj 
(tD;tI) = V   pE   jl   lEj   (tD;tE). The location of the indierent consumer with
night shopping time preference, lN, is derived from V  pI  jl   lIj (tN;tI) = V  pE  
jl   lEj   (tN;tE). For example, when the incumbent opens only during the day while








Notice that when tI 6= tE,  represents an advantage for the open rm because faces a
higher demand while it is a disadvantage for the closed rm (faces a lower demand). This is
because some consumers may want to minimize their disutility in time when purchasing at the
opened rm, at the expense of a higher transportation cost. Therefore, given asymmetric time
decisions, choices in prices, transportation costs and disutility in time all aect consumers'
decision on where to go shopping.
Firm i's payo is i(pi;pj) = piDi(pi;pj) K, i = I;E and K = k;k. So, given opening




j). The prices and
rm i's payo are showed in Table 1.
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Notice that without any additional structure there are eleven equilibrium prices.
4 Equilibrium Shopping Hours and Entry
In this section I analyse opening hours decisions and entry into the market. Given the
equilibrium prices, there are eleven possible outcomes. Notice that those equilibrium where
the incumbent opens only during the night are not relevant for the purpose of this paper.
First, in order to show that entry deterrence is feasible we need to discuss the case where
the incumbent wants to choose longer opening hours only when it faces an entry threat.
So, the incumbent chooses to open all day due to entry threat, otherwise the incumbent
would choose to open only during the day. Second, in order to study the potential impact
of shopping hours deregulation a benchmark case is needed: a situation with shopping hours
restriction where rms are allow to open only during the day. Thus, in order to focus the
analysis in those equilibria which are interesting for the purpose of this paper, Lemma 1
states that the incumbent will not choose to open only during the night.
Lemma 1. Suppose 6 > (1   ) and  > 2
3. Then, I(D;tE) > I(N;tE).
9Lemma 1 means that, when transportation costs are relatively high in terms of the disu-
tility for those consumers who prefer to go shopping during the night, 6 > (1   ), and
the number of consumers who prefer to buy during the day is relative high,  > 2
3, the in-
cumbent will not choose to open only during the night. In other words, when the product
dierentiation in the space dimension is greater than the product dierentiation in the time
dimension and the day demand is higher than the night demand, then opening only during
the night is not protable for the incumbent.
4.1 Entrants' optimal choice
Let discuss E's optimal choice according to the opening times the incumbent might choose.
The conditions in Lemma 1 imply that when the incumbent chooses opening only during
the day, the entrant does not choose to open only during the night because E (D;D) >
E (N;D). Also, the conditions in Lemma 1 imply that when the incumbent chooses longer
opening hours the entrant does not choose to open only during the night because E (N;A) <
E (D;A). Hence, opening only during the night is not an entrants' optimal response when
the incumbent opens only during the day or opens all day. Intuitively, opening only during
the night is not protable because the product dierentiation in the space dimension is greater
than the product dierentiation in the time dimension and the day demand is higher than
the night demand. Thus, according to Lemma 1 the entrant chooses to enter the market (or
not) and its opening time according to Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. When Lemma 1 holds, entrants' optimal choice is as follows.
When tI = D:






18 , then t
E = D;






18 , then t
E = A;
(c) If E (D;D) < 0 and E (A;D) < 0, then t
E = Out;
(d) If E (D;D) > 0 and E (A;D) > 0, t
E = D.
When tI = A:
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18 , then t
E = A;
(g) If E (D;A) < 0 and E (A;A) < 0, then t
E = Out.
10Lemma 2 (a) state that when the additional cost of operating all day is relatively high
the entrant chooses to open only during the day. If the additional cost of operating all day
is low it is more convenient to choose longer opening hours (Lemma 2 (b)). Lemma 2 (c)
means that the entrant does not enter the market when the incumbent opens only during
the day because entry cost is so high. Lemma 2 (d) means that the entrant wants to enter
the market because, by doing so, it makes prots. Lemma 2 (e) and (f) state whether the
entrant chooses opening only during the day or all day according to the additional cost of
operating all day, respectively. Finally, Lemma 2 (g) means that the entrant cannot make
prots in the market when the incumbent chooses longer opening hours. This happens when
the entry cost is so high that the entrant stays out of the market. Notice that the entrant
chooses tE = Out independent of the incumbents' shopping hours decision because the entry
cost F is so high that the entrant cannot make any prots in the market (Lemma 2 (c) and
(g)). The entrant can also choose tE = Out only if the incumbent chooses longer opening
hours. Indeed, the entrant may wants to enter the market when the incumbent opens only
during the day (it makes prots) but chooses to stay out of the market when the incumbent
opens all day. This distinction is important for the purpose of this paper and it is necessary
for the analysis at the rst stage.
4.2 Incumbents' optimal choice
Let us now analyse the incumbents' optimal choice. Notice that Lemma 1 implies that
neither the incumbent nor the entrant choose to open only during the night. Thus, the
possibles SPNE are characterise in the following result.
Proposition 1. The industry equilibria is as follows.
When Lemma 1 holds:
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Next, I discuss in more detail each of the possible SPNE described in Proposition 1.
114.2.1 Entry Deterrence
Entry deterrence occurs when an incumbent rm, facing entry threat, uses a strategic variable
to discourage potential entrants from entering into the market, otherwise the incumbent would
not choose to use such strategic variable.7
Proposition 1 (a) is the main result of the paper and shows that an entry deterrence
strategy (ED) is possible in a market with shopping hours and price competition. In this
equilibrium I chooses tI = A at the rst stage (otherwise tI 6= A) in order to induce E to
choose tE = Out at the second stage (otherwise tE 6= Out). In this case the incumbent
modies its behaviour to thwart entry. In this framework, the strategic variable is opening
hours. When the incumbent chooses longer opening hours to deter entry, this choice bind
the incumbent to a particular output path (strategic commitment). This occurs because
once the incumbent chooses longer opening hours is engaged in a commitment; incurs on
additional costs (e.g. hire new personal or pay the personal for extra hours worked, negotiate
a new insurance contract to cover night hours, etc.), and this commercial policy must be
sustainable in the future. Intuitively, choosing longer opening hours to deter entry credibly
commits the incumbent to keep on opening longer hours because if the incumbent decide
to retract its decision, by opening only during the day, the incumbent would have a cost:
renegotiate labour and insurance contracts, invest in advertising the new opening time.
Let discuss the equilibrium conditions for entry deterrence. The rst inequality in Propo-
sition 1 (a) implies that when the entrant wants to enter opening only during the day, it
is not optimal for the incumbent to open all day. The second inequality means it is not
protable for E to open only during the day when I chooses to open all day, so the best
choice for E is to stay out of the market when I opens all day. The third inequality means
that entry deterrence is desirable by the incumbent because I(A;Out) > I(D;D). The
last inequality means that entry deterrence is caused by the threat of entry, otherwise the
incumbent would choose to open only during the day when there is no entry threat because
I(A;Out) < I(D;Out).8
4.2.2 Other possible SPNE
Proposition 1 (b) consider accommodation equilibria. There is accommodation when the
incumbent nds it is more protable to let the entrant enter the market than to impose
7Following the literature of entry deterrence (see for example Neven, 1989), the key insight is that an
incumbents' action cannot be easily undone (or incumbents' choice must be irreversible).
8This is the distinction pointed by Salop (1979) between natural (or innocent) barriers to entry and strategic
barriers to entry. With the latter, the incumbent has to act strategically in order to protect the market.
12costly barriers to entry.9 In this type of equilibria, there is an entry threat and the incumbent
accommodates to E's entry because I (tI;tE) > I (tI;Out), for tI 6= A. The key element
of accommodation strategy is that the incumbent will not choose to open longer hours when
a potential rm wants to enter the market. According to this denition both rms compete
in the market opening only during the day.
Proposition 1 (c) states the equilibrium where both rms compete in the market opening
longer hours; (t
I, t
E)=(A, A). Intuitively, when the additional operating cost of opening all
day is not suciently high, the incumbent and entrant will compete opening longer hours.
4.2.3 Incumbent without threat of entry
Proposition 1 (d) and (e) state the industry equilibrium when the incumbent faces no threat
of entry: E chooses tE = Out at the second stage no matter what I has decided at the rst
stage because E (Out;ti) > E (tE;ti), for tE 6= Out. This situation is possible when the
sunk cost F is suciently high, then, in Bain's terminology (Bain, 1956), entry is blockaded.




Since I (D;Out) > I (N;Out), as discussed in Section 3.1, the relevant choice is between
opening only during the day or all day. Intuitively, the industry equilibrium condition in
Proposition 1 (d) means that the transportation costs and additional operation costs of
opening all day are greater than the consumers' product valuation, all express in terms of
the disutility in time for the night preference consumers. Therefore, when the incumbent
behaves as an unconstrained monopolist it is more protable to open only during the day.
Finally, proposition 1 (e) means that it is optimal to open all day when the transportation
costs and the increasing returns to scale of opening longer hours are relatively low.
4.2.4 Numerical example
The industry equilibrium describe in proposition 1 depends on several parameters, so it can-
not be easily visualized. For a better illustration that entry deterrence is possible, Figure
1 show the region where entry deterrence (ED) is feasible, the accommodation equilibrium
(t
I,t
E)=(D;D) and the equilibriums when there is no entry threat (t
I,t
E)=f(D;Out),(A;Out)g.
Figure 1 (a) and (b) consider V = 1 and V = 3
2, respectively, and the following parameters
values:  = 3
4,  = 3
2, k = 1
4 and F = 1
2 for (t
I,t
E)=(D;D). These gures show the interac-
tion between the space product dierentiation () and the time product dierentiation ()
for each of those equilibriums. Given the space product dierentiation where ED is feasible,
the incumbent can sustain an entry deterrence strategy when those consumers who prefer to
9This denition is according to Bains' terminology (Bain, 1956).
13shop during the night have a higher disutility in time. Or, given time product dierentia-
tion where ED is viable, the incumbent can sustain an entry deterrence strategy when price
competition is softened (increase in the transportation cost).
Figure 2 show the interaction between the operating cost k and the time product dieren-
tiation () for those equilibriums. I consider the following parameters values: V = 1,  = 3
4,
 = 1
2, F = 1
2 for (t
I,t
E)=(D;D), and  = 5
4 in Figure 2 (a) and  = 2 in Figure 2 (b). Given
the time product dierentiation, it is more likely that the incumbent can sustain an entry
deterrence strategy for relatively low k. In addition, when there are no increasing returns to
scale in opening time ( = 2) the accommodation equilibrium (t
I,t
E)=(D;D) is more likely.
Finally, the region of pre-emption result has the same dimension of the parameter space.
Indeed, it is possible to identify the region of ED in the space of the parameters. Therefore,
the result showing that entry deterrence is feasible for that parametric specication is robust.
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(b)  = 2
145 Welfare implications
In this section I discuss the potential eects of an entry deterrence strategy on social welfare
(W), that is consumer surplus (CS) and industry prots. From last section we know there are
ve possible industry equilibriums and for the purpose of this section I compare the social wel-
fare under entry deterrence with three possible equilibriums: (t
I,t
E)=f(D;Out),(D;D),(A;A)g.10
The rst one is when the incumbent does not face an entry threat, so let call this uncon-
strained monopoly, M. The second is the accommodation type and let call it AC. The last
equilibrium is where both rms compete opening longer hours; call this case AA. Table 2
shows the comparison between those equilibriums and the entry deterrence.11
Table 2: Social Welfare
















4 (1 )   2k   F
AA V   5
4 V   
4   2k   F
Let start comparing ED with M. Notice that price under ED is higher than with M (see
Table 1), but the consumer surplus with ED is higher than with M (CSED > CSM). This is
because the incumbent opens for longer under ED, thus consumers have no disutility in time.
So, when comparing ED with M, there are two opposed eects on consumer surplus: on the
one hand, consumers have to pay higher prices under ED and, on the other hand, consumers





(1 ) . Thus, when the additional operating cost of longer opening hours, in
terms of the disutility for the night preference consumers, is not suciently high, the society
is better o under an entry deterrence equilibrium than under an unconstrained monopolist
opening only during the day. The opposite result emerges when the additional operating cost
of longer opening hours is suciently high. Then, society is worse o with ED.
When comparing ED with AC, the consumer surplus is higher with ED than with AC if
V
2 < (1   ) + 3
4, and social welfare is higher with ED than with AC if V 2
4 + (1   ) +
(2   )k + F > 2V +
4 . The opposite results come out when the inequalities reverse.
10The outcomes of an entry deterrence strategy and unconstrained monopolist opening all day are equivalent,
so it is not necessary to compare these equilibriums.
11Details of the consumer surplus expressions in each case are in Appendix B.
15When comparing ED with AA, consumer surplus is higher with ED than with AA if
V < 3
2, and social welfare is higher with ED than with AA if V + 1
2 < V 2
2 + 4k + 2F.
The opposite results emerge when the inequalities reverse.
In order to determine which equilibrium is welfare enhancing when the incumbent faces an
entry threat, two opposite eects may arise. On the one hand, when comparing ED with AC
and AA, there is less competition due to a lower number of rms in the market under entry
deterrence. This is a standard negative eect of entry deterrence because in a more concen-
trated market consumers pay a higher price.12 On the other hand, the time dimension in this
model adds a new eect when ED is compared with AC. As long as consumers have dierent
shopping time preferences, longer opening hours due to entry deterrence can be viewed as
an increased product valuation for consumers with night shopping hours preferences. Thus,
these consumers do not have disutility in time because the incumbent opens all day, so this
is a positive eect on welfare. Notice that the later eect does not appear when comparing
ED with AA because consumers with night shopping hours preference have no disutility in
time neither under ED nor in AA.
From the above analysis it is clear that which equilibrium is welfare enhancing depends
on the parameters of the model. In particular, whether ED boosts welfare depending on
the degree of product dierentiation, which is measured by the transportation cost . The
following result states when social welfare can be enhanced (or not) by an entry deterrence
strategy.
Proposition 2. When product dierentiation is (not) suciently high, an entry deterrence
strategy is welfare (enhancing) reducing.
Proposition 2 shows that entry deterrence boosts social welfare for low degree of product
dierentiation. Let consider rst ED versus AA. Intuitively, when both rms are in the mar-
ket and product dierentiation is low, competition is tough. This increases consumer surplus
but reduces industry prots in AA. Under entry deterrence and lower product dierentiation
consumer surplus and industry prots increase. Therefore, for a low degree of product dier-
entiation, industry prots is the main driving force for a higher social welfare with ED than
with AA. Now consider ED versus M and AC. For a lower degree of product dierentiation
prots are higher both in ED and M, while industry prot is lower in AC. On the other
hand, under ED, contrary to M and AC, consumers suer no disutility in time. Hence, the
positive eect on consumers' welfare of the longer opening hours chosen by the incumbent to
pre-empt entry dominates the negative eect of higher prices under ED. Therefore, for a low












E = . Thus, the negative eect of
less competition on prices requires that
V
2 > .
16degree of product dierentiation, the positive eect of longer opening hours on consumers'
surplus is the main driving force for a higher social welfare with ED than with M and AC.
In order to better illustrate this result, I present a numerical example comparing consumer
surplus and social welfare in terms of the degree of product dierentiation. Assume the
following set of parameters: V = 1,  = 3
4,  = 3
2, k = 1
4,  = 1
2 and F = 1
2 for AC. The
results are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Notice that consumer surplus with ED is higher than
with M, and consumer surplus with AC is greater than with ED only when  is relative small.
For the range of transportation cost where ED is feasible (consistent with the result showed
in Figure 1), consumers are better o with AA. Finally, social welfare is greater with ED
than with M, AC and AA for low .
























176 Impact of shopping hours deregulation
This section examines the potential eects of shopping hours deregulation on the industry
equilibrium and social welfare. So far I showed that without restrictions in rms' opening
time the possible SPNE are: entry deterrence, accommodation equilibrium (t
I,t
E)=(D;D),
longer opening hours (t
I,t




The procedure to analyse the potential eects of shopping hours deregulation in this
framework is the following. Let suppose that under opening time regulation rms are allowed
to open only during the day, that is opening during the night time is prohibited. Also,
assume that with regulation only the incumbent is active in the market. When shopping
hours are deregulated, retail rms are free to open at night as well. Hence, the set of relevant
SPNE are: entry deterrence, longer opening hours (t
I,t
E)=(A;A) and the no entry threat
equilibrium (t
I,t
E)=(D;Out). The benchmark for the purpose of this section is described
by the equilibrium (t
I,t
E)=(D,Out) in Proposition 1 (d). So, in order to analyse the eect
of shopping hours deregulation we need to compare the situation with regulation, that is
(t
I,t
E)=(D,Out), with each of the two possible outcomes: ED and (t
I,t
E)=(A,A).
I rst compare the benchmark with ED. If deregulation leads to ED, then, as I discussed
in the previous section, consumers pay a higher price but consumer surplus is higher with
ED because consumers have no disutility in time. The social welfare with ED is higher than




(1 ) , otherwise welfare is higher
with regulation. The opposite result emerges when operating cost of longer opening hours is
suciently high.
Now, I compare the benchmark with the equilibrium where both rms open all day. If
deregulation leads to both rms choosing longer opening hours, the consumer surplus under
deregulation is higher than with regulation if V + (1   ) > , otherwise consumer surplus
is higher under the regulated situation. The social welfare is higher with deregulation than
with regulation if V +  + (1   ) + 2(1   2)k >
(V  (1 ))2
2 + 2F, otherwise welfare is
higher under the regulated situation.
Summing up, in this setting shopping hours deregulation is not necessary welfare enhanc-
ing. In particular, when the additional operating cost of longer opening hours (in terms of
the disutility for the night preference consumers) is relatively high, society is better o with
a regulated market. This implication is dierent from previous ndings. Shy and Stenbacka
(2008) suggest there is no justication for restrictions on shopping hours. Similarly, Wenzel
(2011) shows that when there is eciency dierences between a retail chain and an indepen-
dent retailer, shopping hours deregulation increases total welfare and consumer surplus.
187 Concluding remarks
This article explores whether an incumbent rm can use opening hours strategically to deter
entry into the market. I also discuss the welfare implications of this behaviour and so the
potential impact of shopping hours deregulation. I consider a model of oligopolistic competi-
tion with product dierentiation in two dimensions; space and time. The interaction between
an incumbent and a potential entrant is analysed in a three-stage competition with respect
to shopping hours and prices.
The main result is that entry deterrence is possible in these types of markets: for some
parameter values in the model, an incumbent rm is able to choose its opening hours to deter
entry. The implications in terms of social welfare are important because entry deterrence
is not necessary welfare reducing. In fact, entry deterrence can be welfare enhancing when
product dierentiation is low. On the contrary, social welfare decreases if product dieren-
tiation is high, then entry deterrence has a negative eect. In terms of policy, the results of
this framework suggest, contrary to previous ndings, that shopping hours deregulation is
not always welfare enhancing.
This paper contributes to the literature of oligopolistic competition in multi-dimensional
product dierentiation and the public debate on shopping hours deregulation. This framework
allows to analyse how changes in the regulation of shopping hours aect the incentives of
incumbent rms to use opening hours as a strategic variable when there is an entry threat.
Also, this paper contributes to the literature of entry deterrence. I show that entry deterrence
is possible in markets in which rms compete in shopping hours and prices: an incumbent
rm can use opening hours as a strategic commitment. This result closely relates to the pre-
emption strategies studied by Bonanno (1987), Eaton and Lipsey (1977) and Schmalansee
(1978), where pre-emption occurs through strategic brand proliferation. Longer opening
hours can also be interpreted as product dierentiation in the time dimension which creates
barriers to entry in Bain's (1956) sense.
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A Proofs
Lemma 1.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose I (D;tE) < I (N;tE).
Dene an entrant strategy when I chooses in tI 2 fD;Ng as:
Swamp: E chooses tE = A if tI 2 fD;Ng.
Match: E chooses tE = D if tI = D; and E chooses tE = N if tI = N.
Evade: E chooses tE = N if tI = D; and E chooses tE = D if tI = N.
Suppose E chooses Swamp. Then, I (D;A) > I (N;A). A contradiction.
Suppose E chooses Match. Then, I (D;D) > I (N;A). A contradiction.
Suppose E chooses Evade. Then, I (D;N) > I (N;D). A contradiction.
Suppose E chooses tE = D if I chooses tI = D; and E chooses tE = A if I chooses tI = N.
Then, I (D;D) ? I (N;A) if 6 ? . So, if 6 > , then I (D;D) > I (N;A). A
contradiction.
Suppose E chooses tE = N if I chooses tI = D; and E chooses tE = A if I chooses
tI = N. Then, I (D;N) > I (N;A). A contradiction.
Suppose E chooses tE = A if I chooses tI = D; and E chooses tE = D if I chooses
tI = N. Then, I (D;A) ? I (N;D) if  ? 2
3. So, if  > 2
3, then I (D;A) > I (N;D). A
contradiction.
Suppose E chooses tE = A if I chooses tI = D; and E chooses tE = N if I chooses
tI = N. Then, I (D;A) ? I (N;N) if 6 ? (1   ). So, if 6 > (1   ), then
I (D;A) > I (N;N). A contradiction.
Finally, notice that if 6 > (1   ) hold, also 6 >  hold. Then, if 6 > (1   )
and  > 2
3, it is not true that I (D;tE) < I (N;tE). Hence, it must be the case that
I (D;tE) > I (N;tE) when 6 > (1   ) and  > 2
3.
21Proposition 1.
Proof. From Lemma 1 we know that tI = N is not a best response to tE 2 fD;N;A;Outg.
For part (a): the proof follows directly from the discussion in Section 4.2.1.
For part (b): Suppose I chooses tI = D at the rst stage. Then, tE = N is not a best
response if E (D;D)> E (N;D). For this, it must be the case that 0 > (1   2). Since
 2 (2
3;1], then E (D;D)> E (N;D).







Suppose I chooses tI = A at the rst stage. Then, tE = N is not a best response if
E (D;A)> E (N;A). Since  2 (2
3;1], that is the case.






3 (**). Since (*) implies (**), then E (D;A)> E (A;A).
Hence, tE = D is the best response at the second stage.
At the rst stage, I knows that (*) implies that E will choose tE = D for tI 2 fA;Dg.
But (*) also implies that I (D;D)> I (A;D). Hence, the best response of I is to choose
tI = D.
For part (c): the proof is analogous to that of part (b).
To prove the second part of the proposition, assume F is so high that E (tE;tI)  0.
Thus, E chooses tE = Out at the second stage regardless what I chooses at the rst stage.
Therefore, there is no entry threat and the incumbent chooses tI such that 
I (tI;Out), for
tI 2 fD;N;Ag, is the maximum payo.
Since I (D;Out) > I (N;Out), then tI = N is not the best response when tE = Out.
For the rst part (d), tI = D is the best response when tE = Out if I (D;Out) >






For the second part (e), tI = A is the best response when tE = Out if I (D;Out) <







Proof. Let Wn, n 2 fED;M;AC;AAg, be the social welfare under the equilibriums ED, M,
AC and AA, respectively:
WED = V  







WAC = V  
4 (1 )   2k   F,
WAA = V   
4   2k   F.
Now, dene: g1 = WED   WM, g2 = WED   WAC and g3 = WED   WAA. In order
to show that an entry deterrence strategy increases the social welfare when the degree of
product dierentiation, measured by the parameter , is lower it must be showed that g1, g2,
















@ Q 0 if V Q V 2 + (1   )2,
@g2
@ Q 0 if 1






The consumer surplus in each possible equilibria is given by:
Unconstrained monopolist: CSM =
R 1
0(V   pI (y   lI))dy   (1   ).
Accommodation AC: CSAC =
R e l
0 (V   pI (y   lI)dy+
R 1
e l (V   pE (lE y))dy   (1   ).
Entry deterrence: CSED=
R 1
0 (V   pI (y   lI))dy.
Longer opening hours AA: CSAA=
R e l
0 (V   pI (y   lI))dy+
R 1
e l (V   pE (lE y))dy.
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